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RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: 
ACCOMMODATING THE EVOLUTION OF WAR 
Abstract: When drafting the Constitution, the Framers implemented a 
structural system of checks and balances to guard against the executive 
tyranny they had experienced under British rule. During the Vietnam 
War many in Congress perceived the executive branch as over-reaching, 
and in response they passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which 
was an attempt to place a procedural check on executive power. This 
Note examines changes in the technology and actors involved in mod-
ern warfare against the scope of the Resolution. The 2011 conflict in 
Libya is presented as a specific example to demonstrate that modern 
warfare has evolved outside the scope of the Resolution. Based on the 
assumption that war powers should be balanced between the executive 
and legislative branches, this Note argues for new war powers legislation 
that is more broad and flexible in scope to accommodate the evolution 
of warfare. 
Introduction 
 On March 19, 2011, American forces began a campaign of air 
strikes against the Qaddafi regime in Libya using warplanes and mis-
siles.1 On March 21, the President of the United States sent written no-
tification to the leaders of Congress that “U.S. military forces . . . began 
a series of strikes against air defense systems and military airfields for 
the purposes of preparing a no-fly zone.”2 On March 30, it was reported 
that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had operatives working on 
the ground in Libya to gather intelligence for military airstrikes and to 
assess the rebel Libyan fighters.3 The U.S. military was using spy planes 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify potential Libyan mili-
                                                                                                                      
1 David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
20, 2011, at A1. 
2 Letter from President Barack Obama to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-
libya. 
3 Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Spies Aiding Airstrikes and Assessing Qaddafi’s Foes, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 2011, at A1. 
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tary and government targets.4 By May 12, UAVs were the only American 
weapons being used to fire on ground targets in Libya.5 Nonetheless, 
other American aircraft were supporting allied attack missions.6 
 The President took this action without consulting Congress 
through the process prescribed by the War Powers Resolution of 1973 
(“Resolution”).7 The Resolution, which was passed in response to the 
Vietnam War, was a congressional attempt to check executive power 
and restore a balance of powers in the decision to enter a war.8 None-
theless, in response to congressional outcry against the President’s uni-
lateral action, the administration claimed that the War Powers Resolu-
tion was not applicable to the Libyan campaign.9 The Office of Legal 
Counsel, a unit of the U.S. Department of Justice tasked with providing 
legal advice to the President, reasoned that the existence of “war” is sat-
isfied “only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typi-
cally involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk 
over a significant period.”10 Thus, the military operations in Libya did 
not meet the administration’s definition of “war.”11 According to the 
administration’s reasoning, the President may unilaterally take the na-
tion to war using limited military means.12 What the Obama admini-
stration characterized as a unique situation in Libya, however, is becom-
ing more common due to advances in technology and the changing 
face of warfare.13 The use of UAVs and cyber-warfare could inflict seri-
ous damage on another country, with, from the American perspective, 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. The UAVs were also capable of tracking the movements of Libyan troops, target-
ing the troops, or passing their surveillance information along to warplanes, which would 
then target the troops. Id. 
5 Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, At Deadline, U.S. Seeks to Continue War in Libya, N.Y. 
Times, May 13, 2011, at A10. 
6 Id. Support of allied attack missions involved providing refueling for allied planes, in-
telligence gathering, and radiating electronic signals to interfere with Libya’s weapon sys-
tems. See id. 
7 See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 4 
(2011) [hereinafter Libya and War Powers Hearing] (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, Rank-
ing Member, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations). 
8 See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); Libya and War Powers Hearing, su-
pra note 7, at 4. 
9 Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 7, at 5; Louis Fisher, Opinion, Parsing the War 
Power, Nat’l L.J., July 4, 2011, at 50. 
10 Memorandum from Caroline D. Crass, Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Re: Authority to Use Mili-
tary Force in Libya 8 (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-
use-in-libya.pdf. 
11 See id. at 12–13. 
12 Jonathan Schell, Let’s Call a War a War, L.A. Times, June 21, 2011, at A13. 
13 See Unmanned Aerial Warfare: Flight of the Drones, Economist, Oct. 8, 2011, at 31. 
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limited means, no troop deployments, and possibly no involvement of 
military personnel.14 According to the Obama administration, there 
are no “hostilities” under the terms of the Resolution so long as U.S. 
military casualties are minimal or nonexistent.15 
                                                                                                                     
 With this backdrop, this Note asserts that warfare has evolved out-
side the bounds of the War Powers Resolution.16 It avers that the Resolu-
tion was an attempt by Congress to reassert its power over the decision 
to enter a conflict.17 Nonetheless, the scope of the Resolution is limited 
to the deployment of military personnel.18 The modern realities of war, 
which feature increased use of civilian operators and long-range attacks, 
are not subject to the current Resolution.19 Thus, assuming that Con-
gress should have the power to weigh in on these matters, new war pow-
ers legislation is needed to encompass the realities of modern warfare.20 
 Part I evaluates the history of war powers in America, specifically 
the debates over the U.S. Constitution, the War Powers Resolution of 
1973, and the proposed War Powers Consultation Act of 2009.21 This 
history reflects the intent of the Framers and the rationale for balanc-
ing war powers between two branches of government.22 Part I also 
demonstrates the periodic struggle over war powers between the legis-
lative and executive branches.23 Finally, the Part discusses the judicial 
branch’s view on executive power, despite its refusal to weigh in on the 
war powers matter specifically.24 
 Part II appraises the status of modern warfare.25 It first presents 
the increasing role of civilians and CIA operatives in modern warfare.26 
Part II next describes some of the modern technology that is changing 
the paradigm of war.27 Finally, it presents the 2011 conflict in Libya as a 
 
14 David Cortright, License to Kill, Cato Unbound ( Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.cato-
unbound.org/2012/01/09/david-cortright/license-to-kill/. 
15 Schell, supra note 12. 
16 See infra notes 176–272 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 80–110 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 80–110 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 183–272 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 273–391 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 40–120 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 40–79 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 80–136 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 137–168 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 176–272 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 183–207 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text. 
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specific example of modern warfare and the Obama administration’s 
justification for unilateral executive action.28 
 Finally, Part III proposes fixing the current imbalance of war pow-
ers with new war powers legislation.29 It presents arguments that the 
military is just one element of modern warfare, and thus regulation of 
war powers needs to be broader than the War Powers Resolution of 
1973, which only regulates action by military personnel.30 Part III then 
argues for new framework legislation to replace the War Powers Resolu-
tion.31 This legislation would require meaningful dialogue between the 
President and Congress before crossing the threshold of war.32 In so 
doing, this Note supports more political accountability for the legisla-
tive branch and more transparency by the executive branch.33 
I. The Evolution of War Powers in America 
 This Part focuses on the history of war powers in the United States, 
and captures the current state of war-making power in America.34 Sec-
tion A explores the Framers’ debate over war powers when the U.S. 
Constitution was drafted.35 Section B analyzes congressional efforts to 
assert influence through legislation.36 Section C outlines the congres-
sional oversight of intelligence activities.37 It provides a statutory basis 
for communications between the branches on covert activities.38 Fi-
nally, Section D discusses the judicial branch’s decision that war powers 
are a nonjusticiable political question.39 
                                                                                                                     
A. War Powers at the Time of the Framers 
 The constitutional distribution of power to deploy armed forces has 
been debated for centuries.40 The British precedent available to the 
 
28 See infra notes 247–269 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 273–391 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 283–333 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 334–391 and accompanying text. Framework legislation establishes a 
structure for congressional rulemaking. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legisla-
tion, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 717, 729–30 (2005). 
32 See infra notes 334–391 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 334–391 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 40–175 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 40–79 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 80–120 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 121–136 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 121–136 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 137–168 and accompanying text. 
40 See Brien Hallett, The Lost Art of Declaring War 61–62 (1998). 
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Framers at the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 advocated 
strong centralized executive power.41 This model was unacceptable to 
Americans following the Revolutionary War.42 After declaring inde-
pendence from Great Britain, the legislature, in the form of the Conti-
nental Congress, assumed all executive powers, and retained them 
through the time of the Articles of Confederation.43 The Framers real-
located those powers between the legislative and the executive branches 
of government.44 Powers were allocated through a system of checks and 
balances to protect against the abuse of power by any one branch of 
government.45 
 The debate over war powers thus centers on the tension between 
executive power and congressional power.46 Proponents of broad pres-
idential power assert that the executive’s power derives from the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution.47 The Framers experi-
enced the ineffectiveness of command by committee during the Revo-
lutionary War.48 As Samuel Chase of Maryland wrote, “the Congress are 
not a fit Body to act as a Council of War. They are too large, too slow 
and their Resolutions can never be kept secret.”49 Accordingly, the del-
egates determined that the legislature could not direct war.50 The Con-
stitution thus made the President the Commander in Chief.51 
                                                                                                                      
41 Louis Fisher, Historical Survey of the War Power and the Use of Force, in The U.S. Con-
stitution and the Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives 11, 
11–12 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) [hereinafter The Power to Go 
to War]. John Locke proposed delegating “the power of war and peace . . . and all the 
transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth” to the execu-
tive. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 165 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 
2003) (1690). William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, wrote that the King should have 
absolute power over foreign affairs. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *230, *245. 
42 Fisher, supra note 41, at 12. 
43 Id. The Articles of Confederation gave Congress all power for directing war, peace, 
and the operation of military forces. W. Taylor Reveley III, War Powers of the Presi-
dent and Congress: Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? 56 (1981). 
44 Fisher, supra note 41, at 12. 
45 The Constitution Project, Deciding to Use Force Abroad: War Powers in a 
System of Checks and Balances 1 (2005), available at http://www.constitutionproject. 
org/pdf/28.pdf. 
46 Miller Ctr. of Pub. Affairs, National War Powers Commission Report 12 
(2008) [hereinafter National War Powers Commission Report], available at http:// 
web1.millercenter.org/reports/warpowers/report.pdf. 
47 Id. at 13; see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
48 Reveley, supra note 43, at 64–65. 
49 Letter from Samuel Chase to Richard Henry Lee (May 17, 1776), in 4 Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, May 16–August 15, 1776, at 21–22 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1979). 
50 The Constitution Project, supra note 45, at 1. 
51 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
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 According to proponents of congressional war power, however, the 
Framers feared an ambitious executive and therefore empowered the 
legislature to authorize all war, with limited time-critical exceptions.52 
During the drafting of the Constitution, Charles Pinckney of South 
Carolina supported a “vigorous Executive,” but was apprehensive of 
extending the powers of war and peace to the executive.53 He felt that 
such a substantial grant of power would render the executive an “elec-
tive” monarchy.54 James Wilson of Pennsylvania expressed that not all 
of the powers given to the British sovereign rightfully belonged to the 
executive, and that some of those, particularly war and peace, should 
instead be allocated to the legislature.55 Thus, when it was proposed 
that Congress have the power “to make war,”56 James Madison of Vir-
ginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved to change the word-
ing, to give the legislature the power to “declare” war.57 This would 
leave the executive with the power to move quickly to “repel sudden 
attacks.”58 Roger Sherman of Connecticut thought “[t]he Executive 
shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.”59 George Mason pre-
ferred “clogging rather than facilitating war.”60 Accordingly, he favored 
“declare” war over “make” war.61 The motion to replace “make war” 
with “declare war” was passed.62 
                                                                                                                      
52 National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, app. IV at 4, 6. 
53 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 62 ( June 1), 64–65 (Mad-
ison’s notes) (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Records]. Each citation of Farrand’s 
Records includes the page number for the start of the relevant day, the page number for the 
relevant material, and a parenthetical indication of the source. See Alex Glashausser, The 
Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1225, 1230 
(2012) (adopting this approach). 
54 1 Records, supra note 53, at 62 ( June 1), 65 (Madison’s notes). 
55 Id. at 65–66. At the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson endorsed the system 
of checks and balances, saying that it “is calculated to guard against” a rush to war. 2 The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Pennsylvania 583 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). But a system of checks and balances means that war-powers 
decisions “will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us 
in such distress, for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at 
large.” Id. 
56 2 Records, supra note 53, at 312 (Aug. 17), 318 (Madison’s notes). 
57 Id. The change of wording from “make war” to “declare war” provides the evidence 
that proponents of broad executive power use as constitutional justification for unilateral 
executive defensive actions. See, e.g., Reveley, supra note 43, at 66; John Yoo, The Powers 
of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11, at 99–100 
(2005). 
58 See 2 Records, supra note 53, at 312 (Aug. 17), 318 (Madison’s notes). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 319. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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 In the same clause as the power to declare war, the Framers grant-
ed Congress the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”63 Thus, the 
Framers associated letters of marque and reprisal—a limited military 
action—with the power of going to war.64 The issuance of a letter of 
marque and reprisal was an act akin to a limited war.65 As then-
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson said in 1793, regarding the grant of 
a letter of marque and reprisal, “when reprisal follows, it is considered 
as an act of war, and never yet failed to produce it in the case of a na-
tion able to make war.”66 Thus, Congress was given the power to “de-
clare war” and to initiate limited acts of war.67 
 When it comes to the balance of war powers between the executive 
and the legislature, however, the words of the Constitution are impre-
cise.68 The final draft of the Constitution gave numerous explicit grants 
of war-related power to Congress and limited imprecise grants of power 
to the President.69 The Framers believed that executives have a natural 
tendency toward war.70 Thus, they created a system mandating a collec-
                                                                                                                      
 
63 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
64 Louis Fisher, Point/Counterpoint: Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637, 
1649 (2000). Letters of marque and reprisal gave private ship owners license to arm and 
equip themselves for war, and to capture enemy ships and cargo. Ingrid Wuerth, The Cap-
tures Clause, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1683, 1714 (2009). The Continental Congress issued letters 
of marque and reprisal to private ships during the Revolutionary War for the purpose of 
capturing “British vessels and cargoes.” 4 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–
1789, at 253 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). 
65 Fisher, supra note 64, at 1649. 
66 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Restoration of Prizes (May 16, 1793), in 26 The Pa-
pers of Thomas Jefferson 50, 51 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1995). The power to “make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” gave Congress the power to decide what 
property was in a position to be captured by the government and private citizens. Wuerth, 
supra note 64, at 1683. 
67 Fisher, supra note 64, at 1649. 
68 See Reveley, supra note 43, at 70. 
69 Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The 
Origins 2–3 (1976). Congress has the powers to declare war, to grant letters of marque 
and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water; to raise and sup-
port armies; to provide and maintain a Navy; to make rules for the regulation of the land 
and naval forces; and to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Un-
ion, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The President is 
the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and has the power by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
70 Letter from Louis Fisher, Scholar in Residence, The Constitution Project, to Senator 
John Cornyn, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Sept. 29, 2011), http://constitutionproject. 
org/pdf/louis_fisher_war_powers_memo_to_senate.pdf. As John Jay wrote, “absolute mon-
archs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and 
objects merely personal, such as, a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts; 
1774 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1767 
tive decision to enter a war.71 As James Madison argued, dividing power 
between the various branches of government ensures that the branches 
control each other, thus securing the rights of the people.72 The Fram-
ers sought to create a structural relationship between the branches of 
government that would ensure political consensus prior to entering a 
conflict.73 Furthermore, requiring the President to persuade Congress 
would provide an opportunity for the executive to explain the necessity 
of the war to the nation, which would ultimately bear the consequences 
of the decision.74 
 For the first few decades following ratification of the Constitution, 
the use of war powers was consistent with the Framers’ expectations, and 
Congress made the decisions to go to war or deploy troops.75 Yet as early 
as 1807, then-President Jefferson demonstrated the President’s right to 
act first and then seek out congressional authorization.76 In 1848, then-
Congressman Abraham Lincoln voted to censure President James Polk 
for “unnecessarily and unconstitutionally” beginning a war with Mex-
ico.77 During the Civil War, however, then-President Lincoln deployed 
military forces without first obtaining authorization from Congress.78 
Since ratification of the Constitution the balance has shifted toward the 
executive branch, but it was not until perceived expansion of executive 
power during the Vietnam War that Congress drafted framework legisla-
tion implementing a procedural check to this expanding executive 
power.79 
                                                                                                                      
ambition or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families, or partizans.” 
The Federalist No. 4, at 19 (John Jay) ( Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961). 
71 The Constitution Project, supra note 45, at 10. 
72 The Federalist No. 51, supra note 70, at 351 ( James Madison). 
73 See id. 
74 See The Constitution Project, supra note 45, at 10. 
75 Fisher, supra note 41, at 14. 
76 Id. at 17. While Congress was in recess, President Jefferson ordered military action 
in response to British naval hostilities. Id. As President Jefferson observed: “To lose our 
country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, 
liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the 
end to the means.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sep. 20, 1810), in 3 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Retirement Series 99 (Susan Holbrook Perdue & 
Robert F. Haggard et al. eds., 2006). 
77 Fisher, supra note 41, at 18. In 1846, President Polk ordered the military to occupy 
disputed territory along the border with Mexico. Id. This action provoked a war, and Polk 
notified Congress a few weeks later that “war exists.” Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Reveley, supra note 43, at 135, 226; see infra notes 80–110 and accompanying text. 
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B. Attempts to Reassert Congressional Power 
 In response to unilateral actions and mistrust of the executive, 
Congress has passed framework legislation attempting to balance pres-
idential decisions.80 The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was passed in 
direct response to the Vietnam War and governs situations where 
armed forces are introduced into hostilities.81 In 2008, the National 
War Powers Commission proposed new legislation, the War Powers 
Consultation Act of 2009, to resolve perceived problems with the cur-
rent law.82 Both of these were attempts to balance congressional power 
with perceived overreaching by the executive branch.83 
1. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 
 In August 1964, North Vietnamese boats fired on U.S. Navy war-
ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, in international waters.84 The President 
responded by ordering retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnam.85 He 
then asked congressional leaders for a resolution to demonstrate Con-
gress’s support of the military action in what was then known as Indo-
china.86 Both the House and the Senate moved quickly to pass the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution, with only two dissenters between them.87 
 Within a year of passing the Resolution, U.S. forces were bombing 
North Vietnamese targets on nonretaliatory grounds, and ground com-
bat troops were introduced into South Vietnam.88 At first, the President 
emphasized the safety of American citizens in his meeting with congres-
                                                                                                                      
80 See H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., The War Powers Resolution, A 
Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 69 (Comm. Print 1982). 
81 Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 7, at 2. 
82 National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 6. 
83 Id. 
84 H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 80, at 1. 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Id. President Lyndon Johnson believed that “President Truman’s one great mistake 
in going to the defense of South Korea in 1950 ha[d] been his failure to ask Congress for 
an expression of its backing.” Id. 
87 Id. at 4–5. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution read in part: “the Congress approves and 
supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary 
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent 
further aggression.” Joint Resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384. 
Senators Ernest Gruening of Alaska and Wayne Morse of Oregon voted against the Resolu-
tion. 110 Cong. Rec. 18,471 (1964). Senator Morse argued that “we have made a great 
mistake by subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the United States . . . . [W]e 
are in effect giving the President . . . warmaking powers in the absence of a declaration of 
war. I believe that to be a historic mistake.” Id. at 18,470. 
88 H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 80, at 7. 
1776 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1767 
sional leadership to urge the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.89 
Then, in a speech to the nation the President justified increased troop 
levels with the threat of Communist expansion in Vietnam.90 Members 
of Congress did not find this assessment credible and began to doubt 
the President’s explanations.91 
 In response, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hear-
ings on the war.92 While being questioned by Senator J. William Ful-
bright, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach asserted that dec-
larations of war as outlined in the Constitution were “outmoded,” and 
that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the “functional equivalent of a 
declaration of war.”93 Members of Congress were outraged at this asser-
tion of executive power, and many began to regret their hasty approval 
of the Resolution.94 Public dissatisfaction with the conflict increased, 
and the Resolution was repealed in 1971.95 Over the next few years the 
conduct of the war in Vietnam created a growing gap in trust between 
the legislative and executive branches.96 Congress thus turned to the 
larger question of allocation of war powers between the executive and 
legislative branches of government.97 
 In 1973, Congress attempted to settle the ongoing war powers 
struggle and reassert the system of checks and balances implemented 
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. at 8. 
90 Id. at 9. 
91 Id. While the troop buildup in Vietnam was occurring, the Johnson administration 
also sent more than 21,500 troops to the Dominican Republic, citing a need to protect 
American lives from Communist control of revolutionary forces. Id. at 7–8. Congressional 
leaders were called to the White House for a briefing after military action was already un-
derway, and the President did not ask for their endorsement of his decision. Id. at 8. The 
action in the Dominican Republic against the backdrop of operations in Vietnam contrib-
uted to Congress’s distrust of the administration. Id. at 7–8. 
92 Id. at 11. Leonard Meeker, a legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State, submit-
ted a memorandum on international law and the constitutional aspects of the conflict in 
Vietnam. Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam, 54 Dep’t St. Bull. 474, 489 (1966). He concluded that the President had “full au-
thority” as Commander in Chief to commit U.S. forces to Vietnam and that the Congress 
had ratified the action by appropriating funds for the mission. Id. at 489; cf. John C. Yoo, 
The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Calif. 
L. Rev. 167, 197 (1996) (arguing that the Framers relied on the traditional understanding 
that the legislature’s appropriations power would “control[] executive actions leading to 
war”). 
93 H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 80, at 14. 
94 Id. 
95 Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055; see Robert F. 
Turner, The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice 8 
(1983). 
96 See H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 80, at 69. 
97 Id. 
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by the Framers.98 This attempt resulted in the War Powers Resolution 
of 1973, which was passed over President Richard Nixon’s veto.99 This 
Resolution required the President to consult with and report to the 
Congress on decisions to introduce armed forces into hostilities or po-
tential hostilities, unless there has already been a declaration of war.100 
 Although there is no definition section in the War Powers Resolu-
tion or explanation of its scope, the legislative history reveals that it ap-
plies only to military personnel.101 During the Senate debates on the 
Resolution, Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri attempted “to make 
the language of legislation match the realities of war.”102 He claimed 
that to those involved in war “it is irrelevant whether they are members 
of the Armed Forces, military advisers, civilian advisers, or hired mer-
cenaries. The consequences are the same—they can kill, and they can 
be killed.”103 Thus Senator Eagleton proposed that the Resolution en-
compass all civilian combatants as well as “Armed Forces.”104 Senator 
Eagleton predicted that if his amendment was not passed, the Resolu-
tion itself would encourage broader use of CIA and other civilian per-
sonnel in future wars.105 CIA personnel were already being “used as 
pilots and combat advisor[s].”106 Thus, he foretold that not including 
civilian personnel in the Resolution would encourage the use of civil-
                                                                                                                      
98 National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 21. The War Powers 
Resolution’s intended purpose was “to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution 
. . . and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will 
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” War Powers Reso-
lution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006). 
99 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 
(2006)); see National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 21. 
100 See 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
101 See id. §§ 1541–1548; 119 Cong. Rec. 25,079 (1973). 
102 119 Cong. Rec. 25,079. Senator Eagleton proposed an amendment to the Resolu-
tion to include: 
Any person employed by, under contract to, or under the direction of any 
department or agency of the United States Government who is either (a) ac-
tively engaged in hostilities in any foreign country; or (b) advising any regular 
or irregular military forces engaged in hostilities in any foreign country shall 
be deemed to be a member of the Armed Forces of the United States for the 
purposes of this Act. 
Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (arguing that war is not a matter of semantics). 
105 Id. at 25,080. 
106 Id. 
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ians, which was not limited by the Resolution, in the place of uni-
formed personnel, which was so limited.107 
                                                                                                                     
 Senator Eagleton’s amendment was left out of the bill and never 
voted on by the Senate.108 It was proposed that the Committee on 
Armed Services, which at the time had jurisdiction over CIA affairs, 
would instead consider legislation.109 Thus, the Resolution as passed 
applies to the introduction of “Armed Forces into hostilities or into sit-
uations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated 
by the circumstances.”110 
2. The War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 
 In 2008, the National War Powers Commission, chaired by former 
Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher, released a 
report that urged the President and Congress to repeal the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 and enact new war powers legislation.111 Citing the 
gravity and uncertainty of war powers questions, the Commission rec-
ommended implementing decisive guidance for the political branch-
es.112 It found that the keystone to the debate over war powers is the 
need for meaningful consultation between the political branches prior 
to committing the United States to a war.113 The Commission proposed 
that meaningful debate is essential to “promote the rule of law” and to 
“send the right message” to the American public, and to the military.114 
 The Commission thus drafted the War Powers Consultation Act of 
2009 to “codify the norm of consultation,” and frame a process for 
productive debate between the political branches on the decision to 
 
107 Id. 
108 119 Cong. Rec. 25,081. The amendment was left out of the bill because Senator 
Edmund Muskie of Maine proposed that changing the bill could jeopardize its support in 
Congress, and he wanted enough support behind the bill to override President Nixon’s 
anticipated veto. Id. 
109 Id. A Senate Resolution in 1976 created the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
which is required to “oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and 
programs of the United States Government, and to submit to the Senate appropriate pro-
posals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and 
programs.” S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted). 
110 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006). 
111 National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 6 (finding the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973 to be “impractical and ineffective”). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 7. The Commission found that the War Powers Resolution does not have clear 
consultation requirements. Id. 
114 Id. The Commission proposed that “it harms the country to have the centerpiece 
statute in this vital area of American law regularly and openly questioned or ignored.” Id. 
at 35. 
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enter a war.115 The proposed Act mandates consultation between the 
President and Congress prior to engaging “armed forces into signifi-
cant armed conflict.”116 It explicitly defines “significant armed conflict” 
as conflicts that are expressly authorized by Congress, or combat opera-
tions “by U.S. armed forces” expected to last at least a week.117 Thus, 
unlike the War Powers Resolution, the scope of the proposed Act is 
clear.118 The Act explicitly excludes “covert operations.”119 Although 
the proposed Act puts forward recommendations designed to fix the 
ambiguity in the balance of war powers between the political branches, 
it has not been enacted.120 
                                                                                                                     
C. Attaining Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions 
  Although the War Powers Resolution is limited to involvement of 
military personnel, a restriction that the proposed War Powers Consulta-
tion Act did not seek to change,121 Congress later obtained statutory 
oversight of both military and civilian intelligence activities.122 Soon af-
ter the Resolution passed, congressional investigations into CIA activities 
led to the formation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.123 These 
committees have jurisdiction over legislation involving the CIA, and 
shared authorization for appropriations involving the entire intelligence 
community, including military and civilian agencies.124 Both the House 
and the Senate intelligence committees are required to contain mem-
bers from their respective appropriations, armed services, foreign rela-
 
115 Id. at 8. 
116 Id. at 46. 
117 National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 45. 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
120 James A. Baker III & Lee H. Hamilton, Op-Ed., Breaking the War Powers Stalemate, 
Wash. Post, June 10, 2011, at A17. The Commission briefed President Obama and testified 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
about their proposed legislation. National War Powers Commission, Miller Center, http:// 
millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
121 National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 45 (specifically ex-
cluding covert operations). 
122 See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); Daniel B. Silver, Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, in National Security Law 935, 945 ( John Norton Moore & Robert F. 
Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
123 See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted); Rules of the House of Representa-
tives, Rule XLVIII (1977); Silver, supra note 122, at 948–49. 
124 Silver, supra note 122, at 949. 
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tions, and judiciary standing committees.125 This cross-over ensures that 
information does not slip between the cracks of different committees.126 
 The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 solidified congressional 
oversight of the intelligence community.127 The Act requires the execu-
tive branch to notify the congressional intelligence committees of any 
covert action.128 Notification is not a condition required to initiate the-
se actions.129 Nonetheless, the Act requires the President to make find-
ings in writing immediately or in cases of an emergency within forty-
eight hours that “such an action is necessary to support identifiable 
foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the 
national security of the United States.”130 Moreover, the findings must 
specify the department or agency that will carry out the action and 
whether any nongovernmental actors will be involved.131 
 At the time the Act passed, there was debate between the execu-
tive, who was reticent about informing Congress of every covert action, 
and the legislature, which wanted more oversight.132 Compromising 
with the President, Congress acknowledged that there would be cases 
requiring expediency by the executive.133 Congress accepted President 
George H.W. Bush’s promise to “inform Congress of any covert action 
within a few days in almost all instances.”134 Subsequently, in 2001, Pres-
ident George W. Bush attempted to restrict the sharing of information 
with the congressional intelligence committees.135 Due to strong con-
gressional objections, he was unsuccessful.136 
                                                                                                                      
125 S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted); Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule 
XLVIII (1977); Congressional Oversight, Cent. Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/ 
offices-of-cia/congressional-affairs/congressional-oversight.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
126 See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted); Rules of the House of Representatives, 
Rule XLVIII (1977). 
127 Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991 (Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991), 
Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)). 
128 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b). 
129 Id. § 413b(c). 
130 Id. § 413b(a). 
131 Id. § 413b(a). 
132 Silver, supra note 122, at 952–53. President George H.W. Bush had vetoed another 
bill that had required the President to notify Congress prior to covert activities, with no 
emergency exception. Id. at 952. 
133 See Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991, 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) 
(mandating that if the President does not submit written findings within the required time-
frame, the “President shall fully inform the congressional intelligence committees in a timely 
fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice”). 
134 Silver, supra note 122, at 953. 
135 Id. at 954. 
136 Id. 
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D. The Federal Courts: Choosing Not to Weigh In 
 A judicial opinion could provide concrete, albeit fact-dependent, 
guidance on the proper distribution of war powers.137 In 1803, in Mar-
bury v. Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court established judicial review, 
which is the Court’s prerogative of interpreting the constitutionality of 
executive and legislative acts.138 Accordingly, at various times, members 
of Congress have filed lawsuits to compel the President to follow the 
terms of the War Powers Resolution, but cases have been routinely dis-
missed without clarification of the war powers question.139 In most 
cases courts declined to rule based on the political question doc-
ine
                                                                   
tr .140 
 The subject matter that the Supreme Court considers to be a po-
litical question has evolved over time.141 In 1962, in Baker v. Carr, the 
Supreme Court articulated its criteria for the political question doc-
trine.142 The Court noted that the doctrine is “one of ‘political ques-
                                                   
. If 
two  
e constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
neve
See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. By 1924, it was noted that the political ques-
tion re
ys there will be a weighing of considerations in 
ating 
that
 outlined categories, it should not be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political 
que . 
137 See Reveley, supra note 43, at 206. 
138 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those 
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.” Id.
139 See National War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, app. V at 7–8. 
140 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1312 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973). The political 
question doctrine is the judiciary’s refusal to rule on matters that raise inherently political 
questions. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. As Marbury held, “[q]uestions, in their na-
ture political, or which are, by th
r be made in this court.” Id. 
141 Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 
(1985). Chief Justice Marshall’s description of the political question in Marbury was nar-
rowly limited to matters where the President was clearly granted unilateral discretion by 
the Constitution. 
ferred to 
all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion 
that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of 
inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that 
a decision on the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result from the feel-
ing that the court is incompetent to deal with the particular type of question 
involved. Sometimes it will be induced by the feeling that the matter is “too 
high” for the courts. But alwa
the scale of political wisdom. 
Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 344–45 (1924) (indic
 the doctrine was no longer limited to matters of unilateral presidential discretion). 
142 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Court concluded that unless the facts of a case fit in-
to one of the
stion. Id
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tions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’”143 Further, the Court indicated that 
courts cannot use the doctrine to “reject a bona fide controversy as to 
whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional 
uth
s appropriate for Congress, not the judiciary, 
                                                                                                                     
a ority.”144 
 Despite this narrow reading of the political question doctrine, sug-
gesting that some war powers questions might be justiciable, courts 
have continually declined to clarify the ambiguous nature of the divi-
sion of war powers between the legislative and executive branches.145 
For example, in 1983, in Crockett v. Reagan, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the constitutionality of 
President Ronald Reagan’s deployment of troops to El Salvador was a 
nonjusticiable political question.146 Twenty-nine members of Congress 
brought the suit against the President; they claimed that the President 
violated the War Powers Resolution because American military person-
nel deployed to El Salvador were placed, without congressional ap-
proval, in situations “where imminent involvement in hostilities” was 
inevitable.147 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that 
the case was nonjusticiable in its “current posture” due to the extensive 
fact-finding that would be required for the court to “determine whether 
U.S. forces have been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostili-
ties.”148 The district court had concluded that this type of “investigation 
and determination” wa
and the D.C. Circuit agreed.149 
 Similarly, in 2003, in Doe v. Bush, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held that the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent the President from initiating a war in Iraq, was nonjusti-
 
estion doctrine); 
Nat  note 46, app. V at 7. 
5, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
en subject to 
hos
ially discoverable and manageable standards for resolution.” Crock-
ett, 5
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 144 (1st Cir. 2003); Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1312 
n.3 (noting that numerous suits challenging American involvement in the Vietnam Con-
flict had been dismissed from federal courts based on the political qu
ional War Powers Commission Report, supra
146 720 F.2d 135
147 Id. at 1356. 
148 Id. at 1357; Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982). The district 
court reasoned that to properly adjudicate the case they would have to investigate “the 
nature and extent of the United States’ presence in El Salvador and whether a report un-
der the [War Powers Resolution] is mandated because our forces have be
tile fire or are taking part in the war effort.” Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 898. 
149 Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 898; see Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357. The district court also 
found that in accordance with Baker, “[t]he question here belongs to the category charac-
terized by a lack of judic
58 F. Supp. at 898. 
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ciable and therefore dismissed it.150 The court declined to use the po-
litical question doctrine because it concluded the contours of the doc-
trine were poorly defined.151 Nonetheless, it held that the circum-
stances as presented did “not warrant judicial intervention,” and ob-
served that “the appropriate recourse for those who oppose war with 
Iraq lies with the political branches.”152 And more recently, in 2011, in 
Kucinich v. Obama, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
declined to rule on the merits of a complaint alleging that the Presi-
dent acted in violation of the War Powers Resolution.153 The court 
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing either as taxpayers or as mem-
bers of Congress.154 The case was dismissed based on standing, and the 
ur
                                                                                                                     
co t did not examine the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs’ claims 
were a nonjusticiable political question.155 
 Although courts have not made decisive rulings on the division of 
war powers between the political branches, they have provided guidance 
on the scope of executive power generally.156 In 1952, in Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court held that an executive 
order to seize steel mills to prevent a wartime strike was unconstitu-
tional.157 Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion outlined three 
zones of presidential power.158 Courts often reference this opinion to 
analyze the constitutionality of executive actions.159 Justice Jackson’s first 
 
province of the legislative and executive 
bran
ties, and during periods when each party has con-
trol
 providing injunctive relief suspending all U.S. military operations in 
Liby
 
Che rinciples and Policies 344, 381 (4th ed. 2011). 
008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507
150 323 F.3d at 144. 
151 Id. at 139–40. The court explained, “[t]he political question doctrine—that courts 
should not intervene in questions that are the 
ches—is a famously murky one.” Id. at 140. 
152 Id. at 144. The court’s holding was based on the ripeness doctrine, that there was a 
lack of a “fully developed dispute between the [political branches].” Id. at 137. The court 
explained that “Congress has been deeply involved in significant debate, activity, and au-
thorization connected to our relations with Iraq for over a decade, under three different 
presidents of both major political par
led Congress.” Id. at 144. 
153 No. 11-1096(RBW), 2011 WL 5005303, at *12 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2011). The plaintiffs 
were ten members of Congress, who sought an order from the court, “declaring that the 
military operations in Libya constitute a war for the purposes of Article I of the United 
States Constitution and are therefore unconstitutional absent a declaration of war from 
Congress; . . . [and]
a.” Id. at *2. 
154 Id. at *12. 
155 Id. at *11 n.9. 
156 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952); Erwin
merinsky, Constitutional Law: P
157 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89. 
158 Id. at 635–38 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
159 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2
, 552 (2004); Chemerinsky, supra note 156, at 347. 
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zone exists when “the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress.”160 In this zone, presidential authority is at its 
zenith, because it encompasses the executive power as well as congres-
sional power.161 Actions taken in the first zone are presumed to be law-
ful.162 Justice Jackson’s second zone includes actions the President takes 
with neither approval nor disapproval by Congress.163 In this zone, the 
President relies solely on the executive power, and there is a “zone of 
twilight” in which the allocation of constitutional powers is uncertain.164 
According to Justice Jackson, the general constitutionality of actions in 
this second zone is unclear.165 The third zone includes actions taken by 
the President that are “incompatible with the . . . will of Congress.”166 In 
this zone, presidential “power is at its lowest ebb,” and the constitution-
ality of presidential actions is most suspect.167 In Youngstown, Justice Jack-
son concluded that the President was acting in the third zone, where 
ons
executive decision.173 Modern warfare, however, is growing outside the 
                                                                                                                     
c titutionality is most doubtful, because Congress had explicitly taken 
actions contrary to the presidential action.168 
 In summary, the Court has addressed the broader subject of execu-
tive power, but it has been unwilling to rule on the specific war powers 
question.169 Instead, it defers that question to the political branches.170 
War powers were allocated to the legislative and executive branches by 
the Framers, who implemented structural checks and balances to avoid 
tyranny.171 The War Powers Resolution was an attempt by Congress to 
deal with the war powers question, reasserting its power over war, by 
forcing the President to seek congressional approval.172 Applying Justice 
Jackson’s reasoning in Youngstown, congressional approval of presiden-
tial decisions to go to war would strengthen the constitutionality of the 
 
 U.S. at 635 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
7. 
t 637. 
 U.S. at 637 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
 Chemerinsky, supra note 156, at 347, 381; supra notes 137–168 and accompany-
ing 
0 Chemerinsky, supra note 156, at 374; see supra notes 137–168 and accompanying 
text
160 Youngstown, 343
161 Id. at 635–3
162 Id. a
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. 
166 Youngstown, 343
167 Id. at 637–38. 
168 Id. at 640, 655. 
169 See
text. 
17
. 
171 See supra notes 40–79 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 80–120 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 156–168 and accompanying text. 
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strictures of the War Powers Resolution.174 Specifically, modern warfare 
technologies and methods allow the President to act without the ap-
proval of Congress, thereby asserting more war-making power.175 
II.
e legislative branch is ceding war-
making power to the President.182 
A
                                                                                                                     
Modern Warfare Carves Out Increasing Executive Power 
 The ambiguity in congressional and presidential war powers aug-
ments the tension between the President’s desire to enter foreign wars 
and Congress’s inherent reticence as direct representatives of the peo-
ple.176 This ambiguity creates a risk that presidential power will increase 
if unchecked.177 Furthermore, modern technological and warfare devel-
opments increase the potential for aggrandizing the executive  power.178 
 Section A of this Part explains that modern wars are fought by 
government civilians and contractors as much as, and sometimes more 
than, they are fought by military personnel.179 Section B then describes 
how improvements in military technology are changing the modes by 
which countries wage war.180 Section C presents the 2011 action in Lib-
ya as an example, provides an analysis of the executive’s claims that the 
action in Libya was outside the scope of the War Powers Resolution, 
and demonstrates that the Resolution is an insufficient check on execu-
tive power in the context of modern conflicts.181 This Part suggests that 
against the backdrop of the outmoded statute and judicial refusal to 
settle the war powers dispute, th
. The Cast of Characters Is Changing: The “Who” of Modern Warfare 
 Civilians have always been involved in military operations, but the 
level of involvement today is unprecedented.183 By some accounts, civil-
 
d War Powers Hearing, supra note 7, at 19–20. 
nal War Powers Commission Report, supra note 46, at 12. 
 in Europe. But the scale and scope of what we’re seeing today is 
unp
174 See Libya an
175 Id. at 24. 
176 Natio
177 Id. 
178 Fisher, supra note 9, at 50. 
179 See infra notes 183–207 and accompanying text. 
180 See infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text. 
181 See infra notes 247–269 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 183–272 and accompanying text. 
183 See James Surowiecki, Army, Inc., New Yorker, Jan. 12, 2004, at 27 (“To be sure, ci-
vilian involvement in military operations is nothing new—the French Army took taxicabs 
to the front in 1914—and private contractors have historically played a greater role in the 
United States than
recedented.”). 
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ians hold half of all defense-related jobs.184 Many of these civilians serve 
in logistics- and support-related roles, such as cleaning offices, doing 
the laundry, and maintaining roads for the military.185 Still others have 
much more direct involvement, such as in combat missions, protecting 
 per-
nn
                                                                                                                     
dignitaries, and possibly targeting terrorists in impenetrable areas of 
the world.186 
 Civilian operatives of the CIA’s clandestine service deployed to hos-
tile environments now perform roles once reserved for military person-
nel.187 This change in CIA operations stemmed from the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 and the resulting Global War on Terror.188 The CIA’s 
intelligence directorate deploys more personnel overseas than ever be-
fore, and forms strong relationships with foreign military personnel and 
intelligence agencies to deepen their knowledge of terrorist activities.189 
Moreover, the CIA operates unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) out of 
remote bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, conducting missile and bomb 
strikes on targets.190 The CIA’s overseas intelligence network contributes 
significantly to military operations, such as the raid into Pakistan that 
killed Osama Bin Laden in May 2011.191 Furthermore, many CIA
so el die in overseas deployments such as the seven that died in an 
ambush on their remote post in Afghanistan in December 2009.192 
 Nonetheless, the CIA does not act alone; they, like the military, 
increasingly bring contractors to the fight.193 In June 2009, the CIA di-
rector revealed to Congress that in 2004, the CIA had hired outside 
contractors to locate and assassinate terrorist leaders.194 Outside con-
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tractors had previously been hired to interrogate terrorists, but not for 
lethal means.195 Contractors are trained to load Hellfire missiles and 
laser-guided bombs on UAVs, and serve alongside the CIA and military 
personnel at UAV bases.196 Still, this revelation that contractors helped 
with planning, training, surveillance, and possibly even targeting ter-
rorists for capture or assassination was the first evidence that the CIA’s 
covert programs were directly using contractors for lethal means.197 
The CIA director ended the program after determining that it was un-
successful.198 Yet the classified program had operated for seven years 
litically to send the CIA and other civilians into a conflict than to de-
                                                                                                                     
and spent millions of dollars, without notification to the congressional 
committees charged with oversight of the intelligence community.199 
 There are several reasons for the increase in civilians at war, in-
cluding cost concerns, institutional memory, and expertise.200 The 
maintenance of military and civilian government personnel is very ex-
pensive, providing incentive to outsource jobs to contractors that will 
cost the government less money.201 Furthermore, the complexity of 
modern weaponry frequently necessitates bringing civilian contractors 
along for maintenance and sometimes even operation of equipment.202 
Additionally, many weapons, such as UAVs, can be operated remotely, 
and there is seemingly no need to have a military pilot in that job when 
a contractor could do it just as well.203 Sometimes contractors have even 
better capabilities to accomplish a mission than the government per-
sonnel that hire them.204 Civilian contractors do not have the frequent 
personnel transfers that military personnel encounter; thus the con-
tractors can spend more time training with complex equipment, be-
coming the unit’s institutional memory.205 Finally, it may be easier po-
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ploy the military, because the executive is not required to justify pub-
licly the requirement to Congress.206 Thus, civilians have emerged as a 
significant component of modern warfare.207 
nces, is beyond the scope of “war” as contemplated by the 
War Powers Resolution.212 
. U
ours are being 
ow
                                                                                                                     
B. Modern Warfare Methods Change the Character of War 
 Senator Thomas Eagleton’s prediction that activities outside the 
scope of the War Powers Resolution would increase has become a real-
ity.208 In addition to a change in participants, development of technol-
ogy is changing the methods of warfare in the modern era.209 New 
technology decreases the risk of injury or death for humans that have 
the assistance of improved intelligence, firepower support, and long-
range automated capabilities.210 Furthermore, technology has the po-
tential to reduce severely the need for humans to operate a foreign 
war.211 Thus, war waged remotely, as made possible by these techno-
logical adva
1 se of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
 The use of UAVs is outside the bounds of what the 1973 drafters of 
the War Powers Resolution envisioned.213 Between the years 2000 and 
2010, the number of UAVs used to support military operations grew 
from under fifty to over six thousand, ushering in a new era of war-
fare.214 The American government, including the Pentagon and the 
CIA, has created an extensive support network including several opera-
tional bases in the United States and around the world.215 As of 2012, 
more military pilots are being trained for and more h
fl n by American UAVs than conventional aircraft.216 
 UAVs are not just unmanned planes; rather they have enhanced 
capabilities that make military operations more effective.217 The 
 
206 Id. at 319–20. 
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209 See Singer, supra note 200, at 129. 
210 See id. at 319. 
211 Id. at 129. 
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213 See Libya and War Powers Hearing, supra note 7, at 19–20. 
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Reaper MQ-9 aircraft, for example, can loiter above a target for up to 
twenty-four hours, microscopically observe activities on the ground 
from an altitude of up to five miles, transmit real-time video to its con-
trollers on the other side of the world, and fire a missile at the target 
with meticulous precision.218 Thus, UAVs bring unprecedented surveil-
lance, intelligence, and strike capabilities to the warfighter.219 More-
over, the use of UAVs allows the United States to attack military targets 
and avoid the high civilian death rates that occurred during bygone 
wars.220 Thus, one of the biggest advantages UAVs bring is that they 
take the pilot out of hostile situations.221 UAVs can fly missions that 
would be too dangerous for a manned aircraft, such as surveillance or 
air sampling after a chemical attack.222 Ultimately UAVs make new 
n combat, enabling the 
combat missions possible and may make war-fighting efforts more ef-
fective.223 
 The use of UAVs changes the risks of combat scenarios, because it 
eliminates the human cost of putting troops on the ground.224 Whereas 
historically, politicians have weighed the political cost of putting Ameri-
can forces in hostile situations, UAVs remove this barrier.225 By mini-
mizing American casualties, UAVs remove the emotional tie between 
public approval of war and the military.226 This removes the need for 
the President to demonstrate to the American public that the human 
costs of war are worth the overall benefit to the nation.227 Thus, al-
though UAVs may increase targeting accuracy i
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size and characteristics of a fly on the wall. Id. Still others, such as the large RQ-4A Global 
Hawk, an all-weather spy plane, can fly nonstop from the United States to Australia, and 
can
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United States to prosecute more effective wars, they may also lower po-
tica
ed to multiple entities, 
aki
 In October 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned 
that America, like other nations, is at risk of a “‘cyber Pearl Harbor:’ an 
attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life.”236 In 
     
li l hurdles to entering combat situations.228 
2. Use of Cyber-Warfare 
 Another type of warfare not anticipated by the drafters of the War 
Powers Resolution is cyber-warfare.229 It can be used as a tool to sup-
port the nation’s interests in many different ways: to collect informa-
tion on the enemy, to optimize the use of the nation’s weaponry, to dis-
rupt the computer network that controls the enemy’s weaponry, to di-
rectly attack the enemy’s national infrastructure, or to impact mo-
rale.230 Cyber-warfare does not leave the footprints of conventional 
warfare, and thus it can inflict damage on another country anony-
mously.231 This anonymity allows an attacker to make an impact without 
affecting international relations, and potentially without political im-
pact at home.232 Furthermore, there are no restraints on the personnel 
that can conduct cyber-attacks.233 These activities are easily outsourced 
to private industry, and tasking is easily dispers
m ng an attack even more difficult to trace.234 Moreover, because cy-
ber-warfare is conducted remotely, it does not require troops on the 
ground, and thus it would not be subject to the War Powers Resolu-
tion.235 
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May 2007, Estonian authorities experienced such an attack when they 
removed a World War II-era Soviet statue from a park.237 They did not 
anticipate that such a cyber-attack would threaten their national secu-
rity.238 The distributed denial-of-service attack rapidly increased traffic 
to websites, depleted available bandwidth, caused websites to crash, and 
threatened the nation’s electronic infrastructure, forcing the Estonian 
government to defend its population and commerce.239 As the Esto-
nian technicians attempted to block their connections to international 
servers, the actions were analogous to a conventional “blockade” of the 
nation’s access points to the rest of the world.240 This was the first case 
of a cyber-attack crippling an entire nation, but it may be just the be-
inng ing of a new frontier in warfare.241 
 There are indications that the United States is using cyber-warfare 
in its secret war against the Iranian nuclear weapons program.242 Some-
time in 2009, a software program was introduced into the Iranian com-
puter network.243 The program, which is now known as Stuxnet, made 
its way through the computer system and sabotaged its designated tar-
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get: nuclear centrifuges that are vital to the Iranian weapons pro-
gram.244 Then in May 2012, Iran announced that computers used by 
many of their high-ranking officials were attacked by a data collecting 
and reporting virus called Flame.245 It is widely believed that both 
Stuxnet and Flame were joint operations by the American and Israeli 
g
d the military 
     
overnments, although neither country has claimed responsibility.246 
C. The Conflict in Libya: Illustrating the Limits of the War Powers Resolution 
 The 2011 conflict in Libya demonstrates that the use of these 
modern warfare methods is outside the bounds of the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973, and thus evades a legislative check on executive 
power.247 On March 19, 2011, President Barack Obama ordered 
American forces to join a NATO operation in Libya, without cong-
ressional authorization.248 On June 14, Speaker of the House John 
Boehner sent a letter to the President, warning him that he would soon 
be in violation of the time limits established by the War Powers 
Resolution, because the President had not received authorization from 
Congress for the action in Libya.249 The next day, the White House sent 
a report to Congress, asserting that the level of American involvement 
in Libya was less than “hostilities,” and thus fell outside the scope of the 
Resolution.250 The report asserted that because the operations did “not 
involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, 
nor [did] they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. 
casualties, or a serious threat thereof,” the actions were different from 
those contemplated by the Resolution.251 The next day, Speaker 
Boehner responded that with UAV attacks underway an
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sp ding ten million dollars a day on the effort, he did not understand 
how the United States was not engaged in “hostilities.”
en
ew a contrast with the 
nfl
eop
                                                                                                                     
252 
 On June 28, 2011, Senator John Kerry held a hearing before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the War Powers 
Resolution and America’s use of force in Libya.253 In his opening 
statement, Senator Kerry asserted that he supported the administ-
ration’s position that action in Libya was outside the scope of the 
Resolution.254 He explained that the Resolution was drafted in 
response to the Vietnam War and was written to provide guidance for 
“a particular kind of war, to a particular set of events.”255 Senator Kerry 
reasoned that after many years of fighting and the loss of almost 60,000 
American lives in Vietnam, Congress drafted the law to ensure that the 
legislative branch would be able to weigh in before American soldiers 
are sent abroad.256 At this point, Senator Kerry dr
co ict in Libya, which was “a very limited operation” and did not 
involve American armed forces in “hostilities.”257 
 Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking member of the Committee, 
expressed dismay that the President acted unilaterally without seeking 
congressional authorization to initiate military action in Libya.258 He 
expressed that even if the President did have the legal authority to 
initiate a war without congressional approval, that did not mean the 
action was “wise or helpful to the operation.”259 He suggested that most 
p le educated on the matter would agree that the President should 
“seek congressional authorization for war when circumstances allow.”260 
 Harold Koh, a legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State, ex-
plained the administration’s legal position on war powers.261 The 
American military activity in Libya was limited largely to providing in-
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telligence and refueling for NATO allies.262 The administration’s view 
was that in cases like this when the military engages in a “limited mili-
tary mission that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited 
sk 
s.268 Thus the administra-
on
te augmentation of executive 
power, others believe that the Resolution should be amended to pro-
vide a leg
ri of serious escalation and employs limited military means,” the “hos-
tilities” are not covered by the Resolution.263 
 Mr. Koh, like Senator Kerry, differentiated the action from those 
envisioned by the drafters of the War Powers Resolution.264 Unlike pre-
vious administrations, the Obama administration did not challenge the 
constitutionality of the Resolution.265 Rather, it argued that the Resolu-
tion was drafted to “play a particular role,” and that to “play that role 
effectively in this century” the Resolution would require modifica-
tion.266 The Resolution regulates “the introduction of U.S. Armed 
Forces into hostilities.”267 As Mr. Koh explained, the Resolution does 
not address the situation of “unmanned uses of weapons that can de-
liver huge volumes of violence,” such as UAV
ti  claimed that there was a large hole in the Resolution for combat 
activities employing unmanned weaponry.269 
 Clearly, the use of technologies such as UAVs and cyber-attacks in 
modern warfare are outside the bounds of the War Powers Resolution 
as it currently stands.270 This removes a legislative check on executive 
power, and when considered in light of historical views on the balance 
of power, augments executive power.271 Although some consider mod-
ern warfare methods to be a legitima
islative check to this power.272 
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III. Restoring the Necessary Balance of Power 
 This Part argues for the restoration of balance between the execu-
tive and legislative branches in light of the nature of modern warfare 
and limitations of the War Powers Resolution.273 It asserts that the Reso-
lution can no longer accomplish its intended purpose and should be 
plare ced by new war powers framework legislation.274 As Senator Tho-
mas Eagleton stated in his attempt to broaden the Resolution, “[e]ither 
we are involved in hostilities or we are not.”275 Thus, the law should be 
written to “match the realities of war.”276 
 Section A asserts that the War Powers Resolution is outdated.277 
Modern warfare is happening outside the bounds of the Resolution, 
and the U.S. Constitution’s system of checks and balances calls for re-
calibrating the balance.278 Section B proposes new framework legisla-
tion on war powers.279 It endorses broader legislation to accommodate 
inevitable chan zes that much 
of modern wa s, the legisla-
on 
to separation and balance of powers has been seen as necessary for pre-
venting tyranny.283 In response to unilateral action by the executive, 
Congress attempted to reassert its prerogative over war powers in 
ges in future technology.280 It also recogni
rfare is reliant on covert operations.281 Thu
ti should be bifurcated to accommodate open as well as covert war-
fare.282 
A. The Balance of War Powers Is Out of Kilter 
 Since the framing of the Constitution, the American commitment 
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1973.284 Although broad issues prompted the statute, the result was a 
limited doctrine.285 Its limitations on presidential power are now con-
strained by its own parameters as the Resolution applies only to military 
personnel.286 Thus, over time, warfare outgrew the strictures established 
by the Resolution, and executive control over war is once again overly 
powerful.287 
T
ith their lives and money— 
 sc
                                                                                                                     
1. he Need for Balance of Powers 
 The American constitutional democracy’s system of checks and 
balances supports a “joint decision” system.288 This model of decision 
making gives the President the unilateral power to make war, without 
authorization from Congress, only in emergency situations.289 These 
scenarios include the need to fend off an attack on the United States, 
to prevent an imminent attack, and to protect American citizens whose 
lives are threatened, as opposed to scenarios involving a “sustained use 
of force.”290 Conversely, any use of armed forces for sustained opera-
tions and non-emergencies should require consultation with Con-
gress.291 This division of powers between the branches of government 
ensures that the decision to bring the nation into war—a significant 
decision that the American people pay for w
is rutinized by both political branches.292 
 The negotiations over the powers allocated to the executive and 
legislative branches during the Constitution’s drafting lend support to 
this view.293 It was asserted that the legislative branch would proceed 
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too slowly to respond to and appropriately repel attacks on the na-
tion.294 Still, the Framers thought it was necessary to change the word-
ing to give the President the power to act in emergency situations.295 
Thus the meaning of “declare war” was likely understood by the Fram-
ers as power over war-making decisions, excluding defensive and emer-
gency situations.296 Their debate implies that outside of the necessity 
for the President to repel attacks, the power to “make war” remains 
ith
ould have authority over the reality of modern 
day civilians at war.306 
                                                                                                                     
w  Congress.297 
 Furthermore, when the Framers discussed war powers, they did 
not envision actions by only the military.298 Rather, they envisioned con-
trol over both public and private actors in war.299 The congressional 
power to grant letters of marque and reprisal lends support to this 
view.300 This power brought privately owned ships into the service of 
the nation to capture and kill enemy forces.301 Letters of marque and 
reprisal were vital to the nation in the late eighteenth century, because 
at the time, the United States did not have a sufficient Navy to stand up 
against the power of the large British Navy.302 Rather, the United States 
had to get assistance from civilian vessels.303 Similarly, modern warfare 
is better fought with the use of civilian augmenters.304 The military re-
lies on government civilians and contractors to increase capabilities at 
war.305 Thus, just as Congress was given power to grant letters of mar-
que and reprisal, it sh
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 An appropriate balance of powers is evidenced in modern statutes, 
such as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991.307 Although the statute 
acknowledges the importance of covert activities to national security, it 
works within the framework of the Constitution.308 The Act requires the 
executive to keep the congressional oversight committees “fully and cur-
rently informed of the intelligence activities.”309 Thus, it is understood 
that the President must sanction covert activities for national security, but 
that the activities are subject to scrutiny by members of Congress.310 This 
allows for further review and political debate by representatives of the 
nation on issues that affect the nation.311 Lack of adherence to this sys-
tem could result in the tyranny so feared by the Framers.312 
2. The Experience in Libya Demonstrates That the War Powers 
Resolution Is Outdated 
 The use of technology, such as UAVs and cyber-warfare, which fall 
outside the War Powers Resolution, is on the rise.313 Thus, although the 
Obama administration claimed that the conflict in Libya was a unique 
situation and a narrow carve-out from the Resolution, the evolution of 
technology and changes in modern warfare demonstrate that Libya is 
not unique.314 There is also increasing wartime involvement of gov-
ernment civilians and contractors, which is outside the scope of the 
Resolution.315 Thus, the small exception to the War Powers Resolution 
claimed by the executive branch is a rapidly growing gap that nullifies 
the Resolution’s attempt to balance war powers.316 
 The characteristics of UAVs and cyber-warfare that make them 
beneficial to the military also put them squarely within the Obama ad-
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ministration’s exception to the War Powers Resolution.317 UAVs and 
cyber-warfare allow the United States to fight long-distance wars, with-
out deploying military personnel overseas, and with little risk of endan-
gering American lives.318 Nonetheless, both UAVs and cyber-attacks 
could have the same effects as a conventional military attack, and both 
could result in reprisal by adversaries against America.319 Thus, just as a 
nation could pay a heavy price for introducing soldiers into combat, 
use of remotely operated technology could also be costly.320 Nonethe-
less, these technologies enable the President to act against adversaries 
without having to negotiate the obstacle of congressional consulta-
tion.321 
 Furthermore, the War Powers Resolution is limited to U.S. Armed 
Forces, and does not apply to the CIA or other civilians at war.322 This 
gap was acknowledged at the time the Resolution was drafted.323 The 
CIA and civilian contractors have since become a larger part of Ameri-
can war fighting.324 In fact, during the 2011 conflict in Libya, there 
were reports of CIA personnel on the ground.325 Yet, since they were 
not military personnel, the Resolution did not apply.326 
 The War Powers Resolution was an attempt to check unbounded 
executive war power, but it was clearly written for a 1973-era war.327 
Technological innovation and the changing face of warfare have 
evolved to put modern military actions outside the scope of the Resolu-
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tion.328 The result of this evolution is nearly unbounded war powers for 
the executive branch.329 Nonetheless, modern military actions should 
be subject to the system of checks and balances established in the Con-
stitution.330 Without this political dialogue, the executive could spend 
millions of dollars, endanger American lives, and embroil the nation in 
international disputes more easily.331 As stated by George Mason, the 
constitutional check should “clog” rather than facilitate war, and guar-
antee that decisions are made in the best interests of the nation.332 To 
ensure a broader congressional role and achieve the appropriate bal-
ance of war powers, a new statutory framework is needed.333 
B. Proposed Amendment to the War Powers Resolution 
 Congress should draft framework legislation to formalize its role in 
the decision to enter a war, thereby restoring the balance of powers con-
templated by the Framers.334 As noted above, when the President makes 
war powers decisions in the absence of congressional action, the deci-
sions are in Justice Robert Jackson’s “zone of twilight” and are of dubi-
ous constitutionality.335 Passing new legislation mandating that the Pres-
ident consult with Congress—-and obtain approval or disapproval— -
would solidify the constitutionality of war-making decisions.336 The Pres-
ident’s decision would thus fall within either Justice Jackson’s first or 
third categories, which would clarify or strengthen the constitutionality 
of the executive action.337 
 In 2008, the National War Powers Commission proposed new legis-
lation, the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009.338 This proposed legis-
lation would clarify some of the issues that limit the effectiveness of the 
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War Powers Resolution of 1973, and would require Congress to act af-
firmatively in response to presidential war powers decisions.339 Although 
this proposal was a step in the right direction, the proposal requires fur-
ther modification to encompass the full reality of modern warfare.340 
The modifications proposed below will ensure that the new law has suf-
ficient breadth to encompass all conflicts regardless of the actors.341 Fur-
thermore, the modifications incorporate a bifurcated process to ac-
commodate the realities of fighting modern wars, which rely on covert 
actions.342 These proposed reforms bring the balance of power between 
the executive and legislative branches more closely in line with the 
Framers’ intent and more thoroughly accommodate the realities of 
modern warfare.343 
1. Revise the Scope of War Powers Legislation 
 The scope of actors that fall within the War Powers Consultation 
proposal should be broadened.344 The proposal currently is limited to 
“combat operation[s] by U.S. armed forces.”345 The legislation should 
be more expansive, and closer to the reality of modern war fighting, 
which is conducted by many actors in addition to the military.346 This 
change could be accomplished by omitting the words “armed forc-
es.”347 Therefore, the scope of the legislation should be modified to 
encompass “any combat operation by the United States.”348 This 
change to the proposed legislation would encompass military, govern-
ment civilians, contractors, UAVs, and other technological innovations 
that act on behalf of the nation.349 
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 The scope of conflicts that fall within the War Powers Consultation 
proposal should also be broadened.350 The proposed legislation cur-
rently applies to “any conflict expressly authorized by Congress, or . . . 
combat operations lasting more than a week or expected by the Presi-
dent to last more than a week.”351 On the one hand, this proposal 
would encompass the 2011 action in Libya.352 On the other hand, it 
would not encompass short-duration, high-impact strikes, such as the 
cyber-attack launched against Estonia in 2007.353 Although an action 
may be of short duration, it may have long-term effects, and it may have 
sufficient force to profoundly affect the United States in the form of 
money, personnel, or foreign relations.354 Thus, language should be 
added to the proposed legislation to make it applicable to all offensive 
strikes.355 This expansion would add scenarios that are likely to insti-
gate reprisal against America.356 Therefore, this modification would 
force the President to explain to Congress why a fight is worth starting 
and why it is in the national interest.357 Furthermore, this change 
would still allow the executive to act unilaterally to defend the country 
against attacks, and would ensure the balance between the political 
branches intended by the Framers.358 
                                                                                                                     
2. Bifurcation of the Oversight Process 
 To check effectively the President’s war power, Congress should 
divide the process of congressional oversight so it is tailored to address 
both open and covert warfare.359 The War Powers Consultation pro-
posal specifically exempts “covert operations” from its scope.360 None-
theless, “covert operations” are a significant element of modern war-
fare.361 Covert actions should therefore not be exempt from legislation 
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that governs war powers, because the Constitution envisions a role for 
both the Congress and the President in the decision to enter a war.362 
 The Commission’s proposed legislation calls for creation of a Joint 
Congressional Consultation Committee.363 This Committee would be 
composed of the minority leaders of the House and Senate, the major-
ity leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the chairs and 
ranking members of the Senate and House committees on foreign af-
fairs, armed services, intelligence, and appropriations.364 Thus, the 
Committee closely mirrors the requirements of the existing congres-
sional oversight committees on intelligence.365 The proposed legisla-
tion should be amended so that all intended acts of war by the execu-
tive, including open and covert actions, are initially referred to this 
Committee.366 
 For non-covert operations, the War Powers Consultation proposal 
outlines a process for congressional oversight.367 The President is re-
quired to have meaningful consultation with the Committee, rather 
than just notification.368 This consultation must occur prior to the con-
flict, or in emergent circumstances, within three calendar days after 
operations begin.369 The proposal also requires that Congress act to 
approve or disapprove of the action.370 If Congress has not acted on its 
own accord, the Committee is required to “introduce an identical con-
current resolution in the Senate and House.”371 This process would 
result in meaningful consultation between the President and Congress, 
and would mandate that Congress act to check the President’s power 
when appropriate.372 
 This proposed legislation should be modified so that in situations 
that require covert operations, the process would be modeled on the 
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Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991.373 In these situations, the Joint Con-
gressional Consultation Committee would assume an analogous role to 
the existing Senate and House intelligence committees.374 Thus, the 
members of the Committee could engage in fully informed consulta-
tion with the President, rather than being limited to the discussion of 
only non-covert actions.375 Following the model of the Intelligence 
Oversight Act of 1991, the process for covert operations should require 
the President to make a finding in writing within forty-eight hours of 
making the decision to conduct the action.376 In addition, the action 
could commence prior to notification, but notification must follow 
soon afterward.377 Furthermore, in a written finding the President 
should specify “each department, agency, or entity of the United States 
Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any signifi-
cant way in such action.”378 The finding must also identify any third 
parties that are not employed by the government that are to be in-
volved with the action.379 This statement will give members of Congress 
the full picture of what forces are involved in the activity.380 
 Upon receipt of this finding from the President, the Committee 
must have an affirmative requirement to balance the power of the ex-
ecutive.381 It should first be required to make a finding as to whether 
the action truly requires secrecy or should be discussed with the full 
Congress.382 If the Committee finds that the action is of a nature that 
requires secrecy, it should remain in the Committee for debate.383 Con-
versely, if the Committee finds that there is no need for secrecy, it 
should consult accordingly with the executive and, if appropriate, treat 
the information as an open conflict.384 
 Once the Committee makes a finding that the conflict is covert 
and should be kept secret, it must be further debated within the Com-
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mittee.385 Furthermore, the executive should be required to keep the 
Committee apprised of the conflict and provide periodic written up-
dates.386 This exchange would give Congress the opportunity to check 
the power of the President, and prevent the tyranny that the Framers so 
feared.387 Additionally, it would enable Congress to balance the power 
of the executive and make informed decisions on defense appropria-
tions.388 
 These recommended modifications to the proposed War Powers 
Consultation Act of 2009 would make it match the realities of modern 
warfare.389 Expanding its scope to include all of the actors that contrib-
ute to modern warfare, and all of the actions with the effects of warfare, 
would strike the appropriate balance of war powers between the execu-
tive and legislative branches.390 This balance is necessary to ensure not 
only that the executive can adequately defend the nation, but also that 
both the executive and legislative branches are accountable to the peo-
ple who pay the price of governmental decisions.391 
Conclusion 
 The Constitution’s system of checks and balances gave both the 
President and Congress powers over war. The War Powers Resolution of 
1973 was an attempt by Congress to reassert its constitutional preroga-
tive and implement a formal structure for the division of power with 
the President. Forty years later, modern warfare has evolved sufficiently 
to render the War Powers Resolution ineffective. Thus, Congress 
should replace the War Powers Resolution with a new, more pragmatic 
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statute aligned with the realities of modern warfare. The new statute 
should incorporate elements of the proposed War Powers Consultation 
Act of 2009 and the existing Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991. More-
over, its scope should be expansive, to encompass all actors and all ac-
tions of modern warfare. Such an approach will ensure real checks and 
balances and political accountability in the realm of war powers. 
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